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Disbrow Confronts Proposition 8: Will
Miranda Violative Statements be
Admitted to Trial for Impeachment?
Proposition 8' had a significant effect on the rules governing the
admissibility of evidence in criminal proceedings in California.2 Many
judicial decisions and rules of evidence serve to exclude otherwise rele-
vant evidence.3 After adoption of Proposition 8, article 1, section 28(d)
of the California Constitution requires that "all relevant evidence"
be admitted to trial.4 The general rule of admissibility under section
28(d), however, is not absolute.5 The practical effect of section 28(d)
is the admission of certain relevant evidence that previously would
have been excluded. 6
Whether prior inconsistent statements7 obtained in violation of the
procedural safeguards set forth in Miranda v. Arizona8 may be
1. Proposition 8 was incorporated into the California Constitution. See CAL. CONST. art.
I, §28.
2. See In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 886 n.6, 694 P.2d 744, 751 n.6, 210 Cal. Rptr.
631, 638 n.6 (1985) (makes reference to cases other than Lance that section 28(d) has affected);
Comment, Impeaching the Accused with Prior Convictions: Does Proposition 8 Put Beagle
In the Doghouse?, 15 PAC. L.J. 301, 301 (1984).
3. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (excludes statements obtained in
violation of certain procedural safeguards from affirmative use at trial); People v. Disbrow,
16 Cal. 3d 101, 113, 545 P.2d 272, 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 368 (1976) (excludes extrajudicial
statements obtained in violation of the procedural safeguards in Miranda from use at trial);
Bryan v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 575, 587, 498 P.2d 1079, 1087, 102 Cal. Rptr. 831, 839
(1972) (excludes testimony of a juvenile at a fitness hearing from subsequent use in a criminal
proceeding); CAL. EVID. CODE §1200 (excludes out of court statements offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted).
4. CAL. CONST. art. I, §28, subd. (d). Subsection (d) states:
Right to Truth-in-Evidence. Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a
two-thirds vote of the membership in each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence
shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post convic-
tion motions and hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal
offense, whether heard in juvenile or adult court. Nothing in this section shall affect
any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or Evidence
Code, Sections 352, 782 or 1103. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing
statutory or constitutional right of the press.
Id. (emphasis added).
5. See infra notes 103 and 108 and accompanying text.
6. See generally Lance, 37 Cal. 3d at 879, 694 P.2d at 747, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 634 (over-
ruled two cases on the basis of section 28(d), causing the admission of evidence that previously
would have been excluded); See also People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 544-45, 531 P.2d
1099, 1109, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 325 (1975) (overruled by Lance); People v. Martin, 45 Cal.
2d 755, 761, 290 P.2d 855, 857 (1955) (overruled by Lance).
7. See infra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
8. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). The procedural safeguards declared
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admitted as evidence for impeachment purposes is uncertain after the
enactment of section 28(d). 9 The existing rule in California, established
in People v. Disbrow,'" excludes prior inconsistent statements obtained
from defendant in violation of Miranda as evidence to impeach the
credibility of defendant as a witness." Unless the rule in Disbrow
falls within an exception to the general rule of admissibility of sec-
tion 28(d), the section overrules Disbrow.'" If Disbrow has been over-
ruled, prior inconsistent statements obtained in violation of Miranda
are admissible for impeachment purposes.' 3 California courts have
split on whether the rule excluding evidence in Disbrow falls within
an exception to the general rule of admissibility provided by section
28(d).'
4
The general rule of admissibility set forth in section 28(d) is limited
by two exceptions. Section 28(d) has no effect on statutory rules of
evidence, those relating to hearsay or privilege existing prior to Pro-
in Miranda require "[p]rior to questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right
to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and
that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Id. The
holding of Miranda prevents the prosecution from using statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant without demonstrating
the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination of
the Fifth Amendment of the U.S Constitution. Id.
9. The issue of whether the rule in Disbrow is abrogated by section 28(d) has been granted
review by the California Supreme Court. People v. May, 172 Cal. App. 3d 194, 218 Cal. Rptr.
152, h'g granted, Crim. 24991 (California Supreme Court granted hearing November 27, 1985)
(appellate opinion depublished, available in 218 Cal. Rptr. 152); see People v. Kimble, 177
Cal. App. 3d 213, 218, 222 Cal. Rptr. 818, 820 (1986) (First Appellate District held prior incon-
sistent statements obtained in violation of Miranda may not be admitted as evidence for im-
peachment purposes after section 28(d)); People v. Clark, 171 Cal. App. 3d 889, 894, 217
Cal. Rptr. 819, 823 (1985) (Third Appellate District held prior inconsistent statements obtained
in violation of Miranda may not be admitted as evidence for impeachment purposes after sec-
tion 28(d)); People v. Barrios, 166 Cal. App. 3d 732, 743, 212 Cal. Rptr. 644, 649-50 (1985)
(Fifth Appellate District held prior inconsistent statements obtained in violation of Miranda
may not be admitted as evidence for impeachment purposes after section 28(d)).
10. People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 113, 545 P.2d 272, 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 368
(1976).
11. Id.
12. See infra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
13. Clark, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 897, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 825 (Evans, Acting P.J., dissenting).
14. Compare May, 172 Cal. App. 3d 194, 218 Cal. Rptr. 152, h'g granted, Crim. 24991
with Clark, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 894, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 822 (rule excluding evidence in Disbrow
falls within an exception to section 28(d)); Barrios, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 743, 212 Cal. Rptr.
at 650 (rule excluding evidence in Disbrow falls within an exception to section 28(d)); see also
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDE TO PROPOSITION 8, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 4-43 to
4-45 (June 1982) (on file at Pacific Law Journal) (suggests Disbrow should not be encompassed
within Evidence Code section 940, therefore, is overruled by section 28(d)); ANALYSIS OF PRO-
PosITIoN 8, Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice, 14-15 (March 24, 1982) (on file at the
Pacific Law Journal) (discussing Disbrow, however no decision on whether overruled by sec-
tion 28(d)); PROPOSrTON 8-THn Vi=A's BILL. OF RIGHTs, California District Attorney Association
(October 18, 1982) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal) (suggests Disbrow will be overruled
by section 28(d)).
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position 8,' or on exclusions mandated by the United States Con-
stitution.' 6 Accordingly, judicially created exclusionary rules founded
solely upon the California Constitution independent of the United
States Constitution are the rules which are not excepted from section
28(d).' 7
Courts in recent California cases'" have held that prior inconsistent
statements obtained in violation of Miranda for impeachment pur-
poses are still excluded after the enactment of section 28(d).' 9 The
courts have relied upon Evidence Code section 940 in reaching this
conclusion. " Evidence Code section 940 is a codification of the Califor-
nia and United States constitutional privileges against self-
incrimination.2' Courts have held that section 940 encompasses the
Disbrow rule, and, therefore, Disbrow falls within an exception to
the general rule of admissibility of section 28(d).22
The purpose of this comment is to show that the rule excluding
evidence in Disbrow survives the enactment of section 28(d). Initially,
this comment will review the background of the Disbrow rule.23 A
general discussion of section 28(d) of the California Constitution will
follow.2" The effect of section 28(d) on the rule of Disbrow will then
be discussed.25 In the context of California cases26 affected by sec-
tion 28(d), this comment will analyze why Disbrow should survive
15. CAL. CONST. art I, §28, subd. (d).
16. See Malloy v. Hogan 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964) (required the fifth amendment of the United
States Constitution.to be enforced against the states through the fourteenth amendment).
17. See Lance, 37 Cal. 3d at 889, 694 P.2d at 754, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 641 (held section
28(d) would be defeated if the judiciary was free to adopt exclusionary rules that were not
authorized by statute or mandated by the United States Constitution).
18. See Clark, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 894, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 822-23; Barrios, 166 Cal. App.
3d at 743, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 650.
19. Clark, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 894, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 822-23; Barrios, 166 Cal. App.
3d at 743, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 650.
20. Clark, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 894, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 822-23; Barrios, 166 Cal. App.
3d at 743, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 650.
21. CAL. EVID. CODE §940.
22. Clark, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 894, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 822; Barrios, 166 Cal. App. 3d at
739, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 647.
23. See infra notes 54-94 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 95-109 and accompanying text.
26. Lance, 37 Cal. 3d at 879, 694 P.2d at 747, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 634 (section 28(d) abrogated
the vicarious and independent exclusionary rules for search and seizure violations of the California
Constitution); Ramona R. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 802, 804, 693 P.2d 789, 790, 210
Cal. Rptr. 204, 205 (1985) (held use immunities were not abrogated by section 28(d)); People
v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 544-45, 531 P.2d 1099, 1109, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 325 (1975)
(abrogated in Lance by section 28(d)); People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 761, 290 P.2d 855,
857 (1955) (abrogated in Lance by section 28(d)); Clark, 171 Cal. App. 3d 889, 894, 217 Cal.
Rptr. 829, 822 (held section 28(d) did not overrule Disbrow); Barrios, 166 Cal. App. 3d at
739, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 645-47 (held section 28(d) did not overrule Disbrow).
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section 28(d). 27 The argument will be made that Disbrow is encom-
passed within the scope of Evidence Code section 940.11 Encompassed
within Evidence Code section 940, Disbrow falls within an exception
to the general rule of admissibility of section 28(d).11 This comment
will conclude that Disbrow is not abrogated by section 28(d).
ADMISSIBILITY CONCERNS OF PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS
The rule in California, established in Disbrow, excludes for im-
peachment purposes prior inconsistent statements obtained in viola-
tion of Miranda.30 Section 28(d) requires all relevant evidence admitted
to trial.3' Because prior inconsistent statements are relevant evidence,"
the exclusion in Disbrow conflicts with the general rule of admissibility
of section 28(d).
Prior inconsistent statements are an invaluable source of evidence
for impeachment purposes at trial,33 providing an important tool for
impeaching the credibility of a witness." The trier of fact is presented
with a prior statement made by the witness outside of the trial con-
text that contradicts the trial testimony." The inconsistency presents
evidence to the trier of fact bearing upon the veracity of the testimony.
The determinative factor in the outcome of a case may rest solely
upon whether the trier of fact believes the testimony of a particular
witness.36 Thus, the evidentiary benefits of prior inconsistent statements
are apparent. A need to exclude inconsistent statements from trial,
however, may arise when the statements were obtained in violation
of the procedural safeguards enunciated in Miranda v. Arizona.37
Miranda IN CALIFORNIA
In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held that statements
obtained during custodial interrogation of a defendant will not be
27. See infra notes 107-246 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 107-111 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 107-111 and accompanying text.
30. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d at 113, 545 P.2d at 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
31. CAL. CONST. art. I, §28, subd. (d).
32. Prior inconsistent statements are relevant evidence for determining the credibiltiy of
a witness. CAL. EVID. CODE §780(h).
33. C. MCCORMICK, ON EVIDENCE §33, at 72 (3rd ed. 1984) (most effective form of im-
peachment is with the use of prior inconsistent statements).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 74.
36. See, e.g., infra note 188 and accompanying text (the jury believed the testimony of
a police officer which linked the defendant to the crime).
37. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Compare Harris, 401 U.S. at 225-26 (excludes evidence
from affirmative use at trial) with Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d at 113, 545 P.2d at 280, 127 Cal.
Rptr. at 368 (excludes evidence from any and all uses at trial).
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admitted to trial unless the defendant was given certain procedural
safeguards prior to making the statements.38 The safeguards are de-
signed to protect against a violation of the privilege against self-
incrimination of the fifth amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion.3 9 The Miranda Court held a violation of the procedural safeguards
requires exclusion of evidence obtained. 0
Traditionally, the fifth amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion applied only to the federal government."' The United States
Supreme Court, however, has held that the fourteenth amendment
extends certain provisions of the Bill of Rights to individual states.1
2
If a right represents a guarantee "fundamental to the American scheme
of Justice," the right should apply to the states through the four-
teenth amendment.43 The privilege against self-incrimination of the
fifth amendment has been deemed fundamental," and therefore, acts
as a limitation upon the power of the states.45 Therefore, all United
States Supreme Court interpretations of the self-incrimination clause
of the fifth amendment, including Miranda, apply to the states. 6
States must, at a minimum, apply constitutional standards set by
the United States Supreme Court for those provisions of United States
Constitution deemed applicable to the states. 47 The states, however,
may impose higher standards through the state constitutions. 8 In the
past fifteen years a trend has emerged among state courts affording
38. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; see supra note 8 and accompanying text (states the pro-
cedural safeguards in Miranda).
39. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
40. Id.
41. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 249 (1833).
42. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795-96 (1969) (holding the fifth amendment guarantee
against double jeopardy acts as a limitation upon the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (holding the sixth amendment right to jury
trial acts as a limitation upon the states through the fourteenth amendment); Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (holding the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination acts as
a limitation upon the states through the fourteenth amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
655 (1961) (holding the fourth amendment right against unreasonable search and seizures acts
as a limitation upon the states through the fourteenth amendment); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400, 406 (1960) (holding the sixth amendment right of an accused to confront the witness against
him acts as a limitation upon the states through the fourteenth amendment).
43. Benton, 395 U.S. at 795; see also 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Con-
stitutional Law §272.
44. See Malloy, 378 U.S. at 10-11.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (court recognized standards set by
the United States Supreme Court does not affect power of the states to impose higher stan-
dards than required by federal law); Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d at 548, 531 P.2d at 1112, 119
Cal. Rptr. at 328 (overruled by Lance) (state courts are arbiters of state law so long as the
judicial interpretations does not restrict liberties in the federal constitution).
48. See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. at 62.
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an accused greater protection under state constitutions than required
by the United States Constitution.49 Most states adopted provisions
similar to the Bill of Rights in their state constitutions.5 6 In Califor-
nia, for example, the privilege against self-incrimination is set forth
in article 1, section 15 of the California Constitution."' The Califor-
nia Supreme Court in Disbrow interpreted the California constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination more strictly than the United
States Supreme Court interpreted the United States constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination. 2 Therefore, the interpretation by
the California Supreme Court gave an accused greater protection than
did the interpretation by the United States Supreme Court. 3
Disbrow, THE CALiFoRN A RESPONSE
In 1976, the California Supreme Court interpreted the privilege
against self-incrimination of article 1, section 15 of the California
Constitution in People v. Disbrow.4 Disbrow was convicted for the
murder of his wife, and for the voluntary manslaughter of a friend
of his wife." Certain postarrest statements made by Disbrow obtained
in violation of Miranda were admitted for impeachment purposes.5 6
The statements were obtained while Disbrow was being wheeled on
a gurney from the emergency room. 7 The detective informed Disbrow
of his rights under Miranda.8 Disbrow stated that he wished to re-
main silent and to consult an attorney. 9 The detective continued the
interrogation in violation of Miranda.60 Disbrow proceeded to make
certain inculpatory statements under representations that any statements
he made could not be ed against him in court. 6' The statements
were nevertheless admitted to trial.62 The California Supreme Court
49. Y. KAmssAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE at 47 (1980).
50. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d at 550-51, 531 P.2d at 1113, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 329 (overruled
by Lance) (citing 1 ScHwARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY at 383 (1971)).
51. The self-incrimination clause of the United States Constitution contains virtually iden-
tical language to the self-incrimination clause of the California Constitution. "No person
. shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... ." U.S. CoNsT.,
amend. V. "Persons may not be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against themselves."
CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, §15.
52. Compare Harris, 401 U.S. at 225 with Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d at 113, 545 P.2d at 280,
127 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
53. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d at 114-15, 545 P.2d at 280-81, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 368-69.
54. Id. at 113, 545 P.2d at 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
55. Id. at 103, 545 P.2d at 273, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
56. Id.
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reversed the conviction on the basis that the postarrest statements ob-
tained in violation of Miranda should not have been admitted to trial
to impeach Disbrow. 3
The California Supreme Court in Disbrow interpreted the Califor-
nia Constitution as affording an accused greater protection than re-
quired by the federal constitution." The court held that the use of
any extrajudicial statements obtained in violation of Miranda was
precluded by the California Constitution. 5 Statements obtained in
violation of Miranda could not be used as affirmative or impeach-
ment evidence. 6 By adopting the rule in Disbrow, the California
Supreme Court imposed a stricter standard of exclusion upon Miranda
violative statements than required by the United States Constitution.67
The principle concern of the court in Disbrow was the potential
harm that admitting the statements obtained in violation of Miranda
might cause." The Disbrow court held that a jury may view the prior
inconsistent statements as substantive evidence of guilt, even with the
benefit of a limiting instruction explaining to the jury that the evidence
may only be used for impeachment purposes. 69 In addition, the court
found that, faced with the prospect of jury misuse of the evidence,
a defendant might forego the right to testify."0 The court held Miranda
certainly did not envision this result.7 '
The result in Disbrow was also supported by the underlying pur-
pose of Miranda.72 Because Miranda was designed to deter police
misconduct, the court felt the purpose of Miranda would be defeated
if the evidence were used for purposes of impeachment." The Disbrow
court felt that admitting prior inconsistent statements obtained in viola-
tion of Miranda for impeachment purposes would encourage police
misconduct. 74 Little or no incentive would exist for police to comply
with Miranda if the statements elicited in violation of Miranda could
nevertheless be introduced at trial for impeachment.75
63. Id. at 113, 545 P.2d at 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
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The California Supreme Court in Disbrow rejected as persuasive
authority the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Harris
v. New York.' 6 The policy behind Harris has gained importance,
however, following the passage of section 28(d)."I If section 28(d) has
overruled Disbrow, the federal standard enunciated in Harris will be
established in California."
Harris, Ti FEDERAL STANDARD
In Harris, the United States Supreme Court held that prior incon-
sistent statements obtained in violation of Miranda were admissible
for impeachment purposes."' Miranda had required that evidence ob-
tained in violation of the procedural safeguards be excluded as substan-
tive evidence of guilt.8" The Miranda Court did not, however, ad-
dress whether the statements could be used for impeachment purposes.8'
In contrast to Disbrow, the Court in Harris considered the source
of the Miranda exclusionary rule as a factor weighing in favor of
admitting statements obtained in violation of Miranda for impeach-
ment purposes. 82 Harris considered that the exclusion of evidence under
Miranda was designed to deter police misconduct that violates the
self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment." The Harris Court
found that police misconduct is sufficiently deterred when the evidence
in question is made unavailable to the prosecution as substantive
evidence of guilt.8 4 Therefore, the admission for impeachment pur-
76. Id. at 113, 545 P.2d at 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 368; See Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222, 225 (1971). In 1974, two years before Disbrow, the California Supreme Court adopted
the reasoning and rule of the United States Supreme Court decision in Harris. See People
v. Nudd, 12 Cal. 3d 204, 524 P.2d 844, 115 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1974) (overruled by Disbrow).
77. Clark, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 897, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 825 (Evans, Acting P.J., dissenting).
78. Id.
79. Harris, 401 U.S. at 225.
80. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
81. Harris, 401 U.S. at 224. "Miranda barred the prosecution from making its case with
statements of an accused made while in custody prior to having or effectively waiving counsel.
It does not follow from Miranda that evidence inadmissible against an accused in the prosecu-
tion's case-in-chief is barred for all purposes .. . ." Id. But see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476-77.
The privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from being compelled
to incriminate himself in any manner . . . . [S]tatements merely intended to be
exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial
.... These statements are incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and
may not be used without the full warnings and effective waiver required for any
statement.
Id.
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poses of prior inconsistent statements obtained in violation of Miranda
would not violate the deterrent rationale of Miranda.85
The Harris Court also balanced the interest in ascertaining truth
against the policy behind Miranda." The Court found that the im-
peachment process aids the jury in assessing a defendant's credibility.87
Keeping relevant and reliable evidence from the trier of fact cir-
cumscribes the search for truth at trial." The exclusion of inconsis-
tent statements permits the witness to hide behind a shield provided
by the courts.8 9 The Harris Court held that excluding prior inconsis-
tent statements obtained in violation of Miranda for impeachment
purposes has the potential of extending the privilege against self-
incrimination to a right to commit perjury. 90 As a result, the Harris
Court admitted for impeachment purposes the prior inconsistent
statements obtained in violation of Miranda.
9
1
The rule established by the California Supreme Court in Disbrow
was relatively clear until section 28(d) was enacted. 92 Under Disbrow,
prior inconsistent statements obtained in violation of Miranda could
never be admitted to trial even for the limited purpose of impeach-
ment.93 Requiring absolute exclusion of Miranda violative evidence,
Disbrow imposed higher standards than required by the United States
Constitution.9" After the passage of section 28(d), imposition of higher
standards than required by the United States Constitution can be
accomplished only by statute.95
PROPOSITION 8: THE VICTIM'S BILL OF RIGHTS
Proposition 8, introduced to the California voters as "The Victim's




88. Lance, 37 Cal. 3d at 882, 694 P.2d at 749, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 636 (citing Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137 (1978)).
89. Harris, 401 U.S. at 226.
90. Id. at 225.
91. Id. at 226.
92. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d at 113, 545 P.2d at 279, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
93. Id.
94. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
96. Gorman, Proposition 8 Comes of Age, 13 W. ST. U.L. REV. 1, 1 (1985); see also
CAL. CoNsT. art. I, §28.
97. CA. CoNsr. art. 1, §28, subd. (d); see also Letter from George Deukmejian, Attorney
General, to all California District Attorneys, Sheriffs, and Chief Probation Officers (June 9,
1982) (on file at Pacific Law Journal) (the letter was prepared as a cover letter for the At-
torney General's Guide to Proposition 8, California Department of Justice).
1345
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red to as the "Right to Truth-In-Evidence" 98 section, requires that
all relevant evidence be admitted in a criminal trial. 99 Section 28(d)
is, however, subject to two exceptions. First, section 28(d) implicitly
excludes all relevant evidence that must be excluded under the stan-
dards of the United States Constitution.'10 Secondly, section 28(d)
expressly excludes from the general rule of admissibility all evidence
excluded by California statutory rules of evidence relating to privilege,
hearsay, or Evidence Code sections 352, 782, or 1103."0" Disbrow is
overruled by section 28(d) unless the rule in Disbrow falls within one
of the two exceptions to the general rule of admissibility. 101
1. Constitutionally Compelled Exclusion
Implicit in section 28(d) as the first exception to the general rule
of admissibility is the exclusion of evidence mandated by the United
States Constitution.0 3 The United States Supreme Court has required
certain types of evidence obtained in violation of the United States
Constitution excluded from trial.'0 In addition, the United States
Supreme Court has limited admission of evidence in some situations
for specific purposes. 05 The United States Constitution, however, does
not mandate the exclusion of prior inconsistent statements obtained
98. CAL. CoNsr. art. I, §28, subd. (d).
99. Id. Registered voters each were mailed an election pamphlet containing the language
of the proposed bill and a summary prepared by the Attorney General. Clark, 171 Cal. App.
3d at 896, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 824 (Evans, Acting P.J., dissenting). The election pamphlet also
contained a detailed analysis prepared and made available by the state legislative analyst. Id.
The voters were made aware that certain relevant evidence was not permitted to be presented
in a criminal trial or hearing. CALIFORNIA ELECTION PA PHLET, PROPOSrnoN 8, Primary Elec-
tion, June 1982 (on file at Pacific Law Journal). The analyst indicated that section 28(d) would
change this and permit all relevant evidence that did not violate federal standards, or was not
encompassed within existing statutory language into trial. Id.
100. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 10.
101. CAL. CONST. art. I, §28, subd. (d).
102. See Lance, 37 Cal. 3d at 879, 694 P.2d at 747, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 634 (section 28(d)
overruled two exclusionary rules based upon independent state grounds, which did not fall
within any exception to section 28(d)).
103. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 10.
104. B. WrrKiN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §833, 12 (1985 supp., part II). The United
States Supreme Court, for example, has required these four types of evidence excluded from
trial. B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE 2d, §480 et. seq. (improperly coerced confessions are
excluded as a violation of due process); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-74 (1952)
(self-incriminating evidence obtained by brutality is excluded as a violation of due process);
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476-77 (statements obtained in violation of the procedural safeguards
enunciated in Miranda must be excluded as a violation of the fifth amendment); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (evidence obtained by unreasonable search and seizure must be ex-
cluded as a violation of the fourth amendment).
105. See, e.g., Harris, 401 U.S. at 226 (statements obtained in violation of Miranda may
be used for impeachment purposes); Walder v. U.S., 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954) (evidence obtained
by unreasonable search and seizure may be admitted for impeachment).
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in violation of Miranda as evidence "for impeachment purposes."' 0 6
The Harris Court held statements obtained in violation of Miranda
may be used for impeachment purposes. °7 The rule excluding evidence
in Disbrow, therefore, does not survive section 28(d) on the basis of
the first exception to the general rule of admissibility.
2. California Rules of Evidence
The general rule of admissibility in section 28(d) has no effect on
any existing rule of evidence relating to privilege, hearsay, or Evidence
Code sections 352, 782, or 1103.108 While no statutory rule of evidence
in California expressly excludes prior inconsistent statements obtained
in violation of Miranda, the rule in Disbrow may have been implicit-
ly codified in Evidence Code section 940.109 If encompassed within
a statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege, the Disbrow rule
would fall within the express exception to the general rule of ad-
missibility of section 28(d). 0
SCOPE OF EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 940
Evidence Code section 940 is a codification of the United States
and California constitutional privileges against self-incrimination."'
The scope of the privilege in Evidence Code section 940 is an impor-
tant factor in determining whether the Disbrow rule is encompassed
within the privilege. Evidence Code section 940 does not define the
scope of the privilege.' 2 Since the legislature did not provide guidance,
the scope of the privilege must be determined by pertinent provisions
of the California or United States Constitutions as interpreted by the
courts. I I
The holding in Disbrow was expressly based upon the privilege
against self-incrimination of article 1, section 15 of the California
106. Harris, 401 U.S. at 225.
107. Id.
108. CAL. CONST. art. I, §28, subd. (d).
109. See CAL. EViD. CODE §940.
110. CA. CONST. art. I, §28, subd. (d).
Ill. CAL. EvID. CODE §940. Section 940 states: "To the extent that such privilege exists
under the Constitution of the United States or the State of California, a person has a privilege
to refuse to disclose any matter that may tend to incriminate him." Id.
112. People v. Ramona, 37 Cal. 3d 802, 808, 693 P.2d 789, 793, 210 Cal. Rptr. 204, 208
(1985); see also California Law Revision Commission, Tenative Recommendation and a Study
Relating to the Uniform Rules of Evidence (Article V. Privileges) 7 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N,
REP., REC. & STUDIES, 157, 170 (1965) [hereinafter cited as CAL. L. REVISION CoMM'N].
113. Ramona, 37 Cal. 3d at 808, 693 P.2d at 793, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 208; see also CAL.
L. REVISION COMM'N., supra note 112.
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Constitution." 4 The holding precluded the use by prosecution of any
extrajudicial statement made by the defendant either as affirmative
evidence or for purposes of impeachment, when the statement was
obtained in violation of Miranda."' Viewed as a judicial interpreta-
tion of the privilege against self-incrimination, the rule in Disbrow
is encompassed within the scope of Evidence Code section 940." 6 The
argument that Disbrow is a judicial interpretation of the California
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and, therefore, en-
compassed within section 940 is supported by Ramona R. v. Superior
Court."
17
1. Ramona R. v. Superior Court
In 1985, the California Supreme Court in Ramona addressed the
issue of whether a California law providing for certain use immunities
was nullified by the enactment of section 28(d) of the California Con-
stitution." 8 "Use immunity" is a term that refers to an order of the
court compelling a witness to give testimony of a self-incriminating
nature on condition that the resulting self-incriminating testimony is
not used as evidence in subsequent prosecution of the witness. ' 9 The
use immunities involved in Ramona required that statements made
by a juvenile to a court or a probation officer at a fitness hearing
be inadmissible as substantive evidence of guilt in a subsequent criminal
proceeding against the minor.'20 The use immunities involved in
Ramona have been deemed essential to the privilege against self-
incrimination of the California Constitution by the California Supreme
Court in Bryan v. Superior Court. 2'
The California Supreme Court in Ramona held that Evidence Code
section 940 was "existing statutory language," bringing the use im-
munities within the exception of the general rule of admissibility of
section 28(d).'22 The court held that section 940 includes use immunities
although section 940 does not explicitly refer to them.' 23 The statute
114. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d at 113, 545 P.2d at 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
115. Id.
116. Clark, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 894, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 822; Barrios, 166 Cal. App. 3d
at 741-43, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 649-50.
117. 37 Cal. 3d 802, 804, 693 P.2d 789, 790, 210 Cal. Rptr. 204, 205 (1985).
118. Id.
119. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1383 (5th ed. 1981).
120. See Bryan, 7 Cal. 3d at 587, 498 P.2d at 1087, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
121. Id.
122. Ramona, 37 Cal. 3d at 808, 693 P.2d at 793, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
123. Id.
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was interpreted by the court as having been purposefully broad to
include judicial decisions relating to the privilege against self-
incrimination. 
24
The use immunities involved in Ramona were deemed fundamental
to the California privilege against self-incrimination.' Ramona in-
volved a situation in which two of the underlying policies of the
privilege against self-incrimination would not be served by denying
the defendant the use immunity.' 26 The juvenile defendant in Ramona
was required to rebut a statutory presumption that she was unfit for
juvenile court treatment.' 27 Faced with the presumption, the juvenile
defendant had three choices.' 28 First, she could testify at the fitness
hearing defending her claim that she was fit for juvenile treatment. 29
Testifying at the fitness hearing, however, may have resulted in self-
incrimination. 30 Faced with the prospect of having the testimony of
the fitness hearing used as substantive evidence against her at the subse-
quent criminal proceeding, the juvenile's second choice would be to
remain silent.' Foregoing the right to testify jeopardizes the juvenile's
chance of being declared fit for juvenile court treatment. 3 2 Lastly,
the juvenile might have been tempted to give false testimony at the
fitness hearing to avoid damaging her position at a subsequent criminal
proceeding. 33 The Bryan Court held the solution to this problem was
to grant the witness a use immunity for their testimony at the fitness
hearing."34 In addition, the court held the use immunity was essential
to California's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination because
subjecting a defendant to choose between one of three unpalatable
alternatives runs counter to the historic policies of the privilege against
self-incrimination.' Since the use immunities were designed to pro-
tect the privilege against self-incrimination, Ramona held the use im-
munities were encompassed within Evidence Code section 940.' 36
The Ramona Court expressly left open the question of whether the
testimony given by a juvenile would be admissible for impeachment
124. Id.
125. Bryan, 7 Cal. 3d at 587, 498 P.2d at 1087, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
126. Ramona, 37 Cal. 3d at 809, 693 P.2d at 794, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 209.
127. Id. at 805, 693 P.2d at 791, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 206.
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purposes.'37 Ramona thereby left unresolved the issue of whether sec-
tion 28(d) overruled Disbrow.'38 Ramona, however, is support for the
proposition that Disbrow, a judicial interpretation of the privilege
against self-incrimination, is encompassed within Evidence Code sec-
tion 940.'11
The issue presented in Ramona is very similar to the issue of
whether the rule in Disbrow was overruled by section 28(d). Both
situations involve rules deemed essential to the California constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination, and the issue of whether
those rules exist after section 28(d).'10 The issue in both situations
is essentially whether section 940 is "existing statutory language relating
to privilege" for the rule at issue. Ramona held that section 940 was
existing statutory language to sustain the continued viability of the
use immunities.' 4 ' The use immunities in Ramona and the rule in
Disbrow are both embedded in the California constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination.' 2 Therefore, the use immunities in Ramona
should not be used as a basis to distinguish the holding in Ramona
from the rule in Disbrow. 
43
The rule in Disbrow is essential to the California privilege against
self-incrimination. The underlying policy of the privilege against self-
incrimination as expressed in Disbrow is that the jury may impro-
perly use the inconsistent statements as substantive evidence of guilt.'
44
A defendant might forego the constitutional right to testify if faced
with the prospect of the jury misusing the statements.4 " Foregoing
the due process right to testify was a significant concern of the court
in Ramona.'"" Disbrow and Ramona are similar in that each rule
attempts to avoid a situation in which a defendant might forego their
right to testify.
137. Id. at 807 n.2, 693 P.2d at 792 n.2, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 207 n.2.
138. See id.
139. Clark, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 894, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 822; Barrios, 166 Cal. App. 3d
at 741-43, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 649-50.
140. Ramona, 37 Cal. 3d at 804, 693 P.2d at 790, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 205 (use immunities
providing that statements made by a juvenile to a court or a probation officer at a fitness
hearing be inadmissible as substantive evidence of guilt in a subsequent criminal proceeding
against the minor were deemed essential to the privilege against self-incrimination); Disbrow,
16 Cal. 3d at 113, 545 P.2d at 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 368 (the rule deemed essential to the
privilege against self-incrimination was that extrajudicial statements obtained in violation of
Miranda may not be admitted to trial for impeachment purposes).
141. Ramona, 37 Cal. 3d at 808, 693 P.2d at 793, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
142. Id. at 809, 693 P.2d at 790, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 209; Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d at 113, 545
P.2d at 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
143. See infra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
144. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d at 112, 545 P.2d at 279, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 367; see also supra
notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
145. Disbrow, 13 Cal. 3d at 112, 545 P.2d at 279, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
146. Ramona, 37 Cal. 3d at 809, 693 P.2d at 794, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 209.
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The opposition to the argument that the rule in Disbrow is embedded
in the privilege against self-incrimination might be that a "mere"
Miranda violation does not threaten the underlying policies of the
privilege against self-incrimination in the way that the use immunities
do. Support exists for the proposition at the federal level.'"7 The United
States Supreme Court has referred to the safeguards in Miranda as
"prophylactic factors," rather than as constitutional rights.' 8 The pro-
position that Miranda is not essential to the privilege against self-
incrimination, however, cannot be supported by the California Con-
stitution. As the California Supreme Court declared in Disbrow, and
more recently in People v. Rucker,4 9 the admission of Miranda
violative statements, inculpatory or exculpatory, for impeachment pur-
poses violates the California constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination. 1 0 Therefore, in California, a Miranda violation is
embedded in the privilege against self-incrimination as are the use
immunities involved in Ramona.
Ramona is strong support for the proposition that the rule in
Disbrow is encompassed within Evidence Code section 940."' Ramona
held that Evidence Code section 940 should be interpreted broadly
to include judicial decisions relating to the privilege against self-
incrimination. 5 2 Disbrow was a judicial interpretation of the
privilege.' 53 Further, the legislative history of section 940 does not
contradict the proposition that Disbrow is encompassed within Evidence
Code section 940.
2. Legislative History of Section 940
The comments of the Law Revision Commission for section 940
recognize the privilege of a person to refuse, when testifying, to give
information that might be self-incriminatory. 5 A literal reading of
147. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974).
148. Id.; see also C. MCCORMICK, ON EvIrENCE §163, at 438 n.1 (1984).
There is widespread perception that the [United States] Supreme Court has become
increasingly disenchanted with Miranda. [citation] Evidence can be found in Michigan
v. Tucker in which the court distinguished between Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination itself and Miranda's "prophylactic rules" developed to protect that
right. [citation] Tucker appeared to hold that a more rigorous or rigid exclusionary
sanction applied to the privilege itself than applied to the prophylactic rules.
Id.
149. People v. Rucker, 26 Cal. 3d 368, 390, 605 P.2d 843, 856, 162 Cal. Rptr. 13, 26 (1980).
150. Id.
151. See supra notes 119-50 and accompanying text.
152. Ramona, 37 Cal. 3d at 808, 693 P.2d at 793, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
153. Clark, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 894, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 822; Barrios, 166 Cal. App. 3d
at 741-43, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 649-50; see supra notes 139-50 and accompanying text.
154. 6 CAL. L. REvIsioN COMM'N, infra note 160, at 215-18.
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the comments would limit the privilege to a testimonial privilege.'
Moreover, section 940, if interpreted literally, would only provide an
accused protection from incriminating statements the accused might
give while on the witness stand.' 56 Therefore, any extrajudicial state-
ment made by a witness would not be privileged under Evidence Code
section 940.17 Accordingly, to the extent prior inconsistent statements
involve extrajudicial statements, the testimonial privilege of Evidence
Code section 940 would not seem to be applicable to prior inconsis-
tent statements.' 8 Under this reading, Disbrow, involving only "ex-
trajudicial" statements, would not be within the scope of the
testimonial privilege protected by Evidence Code section 940.159
Section 940 was derived from the Uniform Rules of Evidence,
Revised Rule 25. '60 The privilege against self-incrimination as originally
drafted in the Revised Rule extended a privilege to refuse, while
testifying or responding to a public official or agent, to disclose in-
formation that could be self-incriminating.' 6' However, in the official
comment to Evidence Code section 940, the California Law Revision
Commission stated the privilege of section 940 refers only to a privilege
to refuse to disclose when testifying.'62 Therefore, the legislature
adopted a modified version of the Uniform Rule.' 63
Although the foregoing legislative history suggests section 940 is
a testimonial privilege, that limited interpretation runs counter to the
purpose of the privilege against self-incrimination.' 6 At common law,
the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination was interpreted
to apply exclusively to situations in which the witness had a duty
of disclosure.' 65 For example, a person has a duty to disclose testimony
if that person is served with a subpeona. 6 6 A witness is only allowed
155. Barrios, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 743, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 650.
156. Id.; see also Respondent's Brief at 27, People v. May, 172 Cal. App. 3d 194, 218
Cal. Rptr. 152 (on file at Pacific Law Journal), California Supreme Court granted hearing
November 27, 1985, People v. May, Crim. 24991.
157. Barrios, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 743, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 650; Respondent's Brief at 27,
People v. May, 172 Cal. App. 3d 194, 218 Cal. Rptr. 152 (on file at Pacific Law Journal),
California Supreme Court granted hearing on November 27, 1985, Crim. 24991.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Law Revision Commission, Tenative Recommendation and a Study Relating to the
Uniform Rules of Evidence, 6 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N, REP., REc. & STUDIES 201, 215-
18 (1964).
161. Id.
162. CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N, supra note 112, at 170.
163. 6 CAL. L. REVIsIoN COMM'N, supra note 160, at 216.
164. See Barrios, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 743, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 650.
165. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2252, 327-29 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
166. B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE §761, 710-711 (1966, 2d ed.).
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to refuse to testify under the exercise of an evidentiary privilege.1 67
Many states, and the federal government, have extended the constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination to situations in which a
witness does not have a duty to disclose.'68 Responding to a police
officer, for instance, does not involve a duty to disclose.' 69 The modem
trend, reversing the common law rule, holds that a person refusing
to answer a question asked by a police'officer is exercising an eviden-
tiary privilege.'7 California extended the state constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination to situations involving police interrogations
in 1946.'"' Therefore, in California, when a person refuses to answer
a question or accusation by a police officer the person is exercising
an evidentiary privilege.' 2
A literal reading of section 940 would create an inconsistency in
the application of the privilege against self-incrimination.' 73 Although
the California constitutional privilege against self-incrimination extends
beyond trial testimony, the section 940 privilege would be limited to
testimony.' 74 This result might suggest, for example, that a person
under arrest would have to assert the constitutional right to remain
silent rather than the right against self-incrimination under Evidence
Code section 940.' 75 Recognizing, however, that Evidence Code sec-
tion 940 was written in light of the constitutional privilege against'
self-incrimination and subject to judicial interpretation of that privilege,
a literal reading of the section does not comport with the purpose
of the section.' 76 The scope of section 940 must include subsequent
interpretations of the privilege against self-incrimination. Therefore,
section 940 should not be interpreted as a mere testimonial privilege.'
77
167. Id.; see 6 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N, supra note 160, at 215-18.
Rules of evidence cannot speak in terms of a privilege not to disclose in those situa-
tions where there is no duty to disclose; evidentiary privileges exist only when a per-
son would, but for the exercise of a privilege be under a duty to speak. For example,
such rules are not concerned with inquiries by a police officer regarding a crime
nor with the rights, duties, or privileges that a person may have at the police station.
Thus the person who -refuses to answer a question or accusation by a police officer
is not exercising an evidentiary privilege because he is under no legal duty to talk
to the police officer.
Id.
168. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 165, §2252 at 328- 29 n.27.
169. Id.
170. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
171. People v. Simmons, 28 Cal. 2d 699, 716, 719-20, 172 P.2d 18, 27, 29-30 (1946).
172. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 165, §2252 at 329 n.27.
173. Barrios, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 743, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 650.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. 7 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N., supra note 112, at 170.
177. See Barrios, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 744, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 650.
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Evidence Code section 940 is an existing statutory rule of evidence
relating to privilege, the expressed exception to section 28(d). 78 Disbrow
will survive section 28(d) if encompassed within Evidence Code sec-
tion 940.111 Ramona and the legislative history of section 940 lend
support to the argument that Disbrow is encompassed within section
940. Furthermore, courts in two California cases' have held that
Disbrow is encompassed within Evidence Code section 940 and that
section 28(d) of the California Constitution did not abrogate
Disbrow.'8 '
3. California Cases
In People v. Clark'2 and People v. Barrios"3 the courts held that
the rule in Disbrow was implicitly encompassed within Evidence Code
section 940.' 84 The courts in Clark and Barrios reached this conclu-
sion by utilizing Disbrow as an interpretation of the scope of the
privilege against self-incrimination of the California Constitution.'
The courts held Disbrow survived section 28(d) by being encompassed
within the scope of an existing statutory rule of evidence relating to
privilege. 18 6
Clark involved prior inconsistent statements obtained in violation
of Miranda that were admitted to trial for impeachment purposes. 87
The statements were vital to the position of the prosecution. 8 Clark
178. CAL. CONST. art. I, §28, subd. (d).
179. See id.; see also supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
180. Clark, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 894, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 823; Barrios 166 Cal. App. 3d
at 743, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 649-50.
181. Clark, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 894, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 823; Barrios, 166 Cal. App. 3d
at 743, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 649-50.
182. 171 Cal. App. 3d 889, 894, 217 Cal. Rptr. 819, 823 (1985).
183. 166 Cal. App. 3d 732, 743, 212 Cal. Rptr. 644, 649-50 (1985).
184. Clark, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 894, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 822; Barrios, 166 Cal. App. 3d
at 741-43, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 649-50.
185. Clark, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 894, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 822; Barrios, 166 Cal. App. 3d
at 741-43, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 649-50.
186. Clark, 171 Cal. App. at 894, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 823; Barrios, 166 Cal. App. 3d at
741, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 649.
187. Clark, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 892, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
188. Appellant's Opening Brief at 13, People v. Clark, 171 Cal. App. 3d 889, 217 Cal.
Rptr. 819 (on file at Pacific Law Journal). Police officers followed a car believed to contain
the fleeing robbers until the car crashed into a tree. Clark, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 891-92, 217
Cal. Rptr. at 821. When the police arrived the two occupants ran from the car and climbed
a fence. Id. Clark was arrested in the vicinity of the fence. Id. Without the statements, the
prosecution's evidence only placed defendant in the vehicle chased by the officers. See Ap-
pellant's Opening Brief at 13, People v. Clark, 171 Cal. App. 3d 889, 217 Cal. Rptr. 819
(on file at Pacific Law Journal). The prosecution could not link the chased car to the car
that left the scene of the crime without the use of the prior inconsistent statements obtained
in violation of Miranda. See id.
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was convicted of robbery. 8 9 The court of appeals reversed the con-
viction, holding that the prior inconsistent statements should not have
been admitted to trial for impeachment purposes because the statements
were obtained in violation of Miranda. 90
Barrios also involved prior inconsistent statements obtained in viola-
tion of Miranda that were admitted into trial for purposes of im-
peachment.' 9' The trial court convicted Barrios of murder,' 9 2 but the
court of appeal reversed the conviction. ' On direct examination,
Barrios testified that he carried a gun because of the victim's violent
temper and reputation for always being armed. 94 A police officer
testified, however, that Barrios made postarrest statements inconsis-
tent with Barrios' direct testimony. 95 Barrios told the officer he took
the gun with him bacause he was prepared to use the gun.' 96 The
court held the prior inconsistent statements should not have been ad-
mitted to trial even for the limited purpose of impeachment.' 9
Barrios and Clark utilized Evidence Code section 940 to find
Disbrow within an existing statutory rule of evidence relating to
privilege. 98 The courts relied upon the reasoning that the scope of
Evidence Code section 940 was interpreted in Disbrow. 99 Barrios and
Clark used the language in Ramona stating that Evidence Code sec-
tion 940 was purposefully broad to include judicial decisions relating
to the privilege against self-incrimination to support the proposition
that Disbrow was encompassed within section 940.200 Although Clark
did not address the legislative history of section 940, Barrios utilized
the legislative history to further support the proposition that Disbrow
was encompassed within section 940.201 Accordingly, Barrios. and Clark
held that Disbrow was encompassed within a statutory rule of evidence
relating to privilege, thus satisfying an expressed exception to section
189. Clark, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 891, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
190. Id. at 894-95, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
191. Barrios, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 736-37, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 646.
192. Id. at 734, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 644.
193. Id. at 748, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 653.
194. Id. at 736-37, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 646-48.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 743, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 650.
198. Clark, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 894, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 822; Barrios, 166 Cal. App. 3d
at 741-43, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 649-650; see also supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
199. Id.
200. Clark, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 894, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 822; Barrios, 166 Cal. App. 3d
at 747, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 653.
201. Barrios, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 743-46, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 649-52.
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28(d). 202 Upon that basis, the courts held that Disbrow survived the
enactment of section 28(d).2 3
Ramona and the legislative history of Evidence Code section 940
support the proposition that Disbrow is encompassed within the
privilege in Evidence Code section 940.04 Disbrow will survive sec-
tion 28(d) based upon the exception for exclusions encompassed within
"an existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege."20 5 Further-
more, the intent of the electorate in passing section 28(d) is not
defeated by the rule in Disbrow.20 6 The intent behind section 28(d)
was addressed by the California Supreme Court in In re Lance.2 17
Lance: INTENT BEHIND SECTION 28(d)
In 1985, the California Supreme Court in Lance held that section
28(d) of the California Constitution had the practical effect of
eliminating the vicarious and independent exclusionary rules for viola-
tions of the search and seizure provision of the California Constitu-
tion. 8 The vicarious exclusionary rule provides that evidence obtained
by means of an unlawful search and seizure of article I, section 13
of the California Constitution shall be excluded from trial whether
or not the defendant was the victim of the unlawful search. 9 The
Lance court, however, expressly left unresolved the issue of whether
section 28(d) had the effect of requiring the admission of evidence
obtained in violation of other constitutional guarantees."' Although
Lance pertained to the search and seizure provision, the interpreta-
tion by the court of the intent of the electorate in passing section
28(d) must be reconciled with Disbrow.
Lance was arrested for the possession of marijuana for purposes
of sale. 2 11 Although the marijuana was seized unlawfully, the mari-
juana was admitted at the juvenile hearing." ' Lance had no standing
202. Clark, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 894, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 823; Barrios, 166 Cal. App. 3d
at 743, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 644.
203. Clark, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 894, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 823; Barrios, 166 Cal. App. 3d
at 743, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 644.
204. See infra notes 118-77 and accompanying text.
205. CAL. CoNs. art. I, §28, subd. (d).
206. But see ATrORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDE To PROPOSITION 8, supra note 14, at 4-44 (the
clear intent of section 28(d) was to limit exclusion of evidence to federal law or to existing
statutes, the self-incrimination privilege of art. 1, §15 of the California Constitution should be
construed to provide no greater protection than does the analagous federal privilege).
207. 37 Cal. 3d 873, 888, 694 P.2d 744, 753, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631, 640 (1985).
208. Lance, 37 Cal.3d at 887, 694 P.2d at 753, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
209. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 761, 290 P.2d 855, 857 (1955). 1
210. Lance., 37 Cal. 3d at 885 n.4, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 638 n.4, 694 P.2d at 751 n.4.
211. Lance, 37 Cal. 3d at 879, 694 P.2d at 747, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
212. Id.
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to object to the unlawful search.213 Had the court interpreted section
28(d) as not abrogating the vicarious exclusionary rule, the vicarious
exclusionary rule would have suppressed the evidence.
21 4
Lance abrogated the independent and vicarious exclusionary rules
relating to search and seizure on the basis that the express intent of
section 28(d) was to ensure that all relevant evidence would be ad-
mitted to trial.2"5 The Lance Court held, the purpose of ensuring all
relevant evidence admitted to trial would be defeated if the judiciary
were free to adopt exclusionary rules for search and seizure viola-
tions that were neither authorized by statute nor mandated by the
United States Constitution. 216 The independent exclusionary rules in
Lance did not survive section 28(d) as being federally mandated
exclusions.2 ' The United States Constitution does not require the
evidence to be excluded in either case.2"8 Furthermore, the exclusionary
rules in Lance did not survive section 28(d) on the basis that they
were supported by statutory authority.219
At first glance the rule in Disbrow appears similar to the rules
abrogated by Lance. Disbrow is an exclusion not mandated by the
United States Constitution. 220 The exclusion originates from the Califor-
nia Constitution independently of the United States Constitution. 221
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 889, 694 P.2d at 754, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 641. One independent exclusionary
rule overruled by section 28(d) in Lance was enunciated in People v. Martin. Lance, 37 Cal. 3d
at 879, 694 P.2d at 747, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 634. See also Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d
855 (1955). The California Supreme Court in Martin held that evidence obtained in violation
of article I, section 13 of the California Constitution must be excluded as evidence from trial
whether or not the defendant was the victim of an unlawful search. Id. at 761, 290 P.2d at
857. The United States Supreme Court, however, has confined the exclusion of evidence ob-
tained in violation of the fourth amendment to situations in which the illegally obtained evidence
would be used to incriminate the victim of the unlawful search. Brown v. U.S., 411 U.S. 223,
229, (1973); Alderman v. U.S., 394 U.S. 165, 171 (1969); Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471,
492 (1963). In Martin independent California constitutional grounds were used as the basis
for the more stringent exclusionary rule. Another exclusionary rule abrogated by section 28(d)
in Lance was derived in People v. Brisendine. Lance, 37 Cal. 3d at 879, 694 P.2d at 747,
210 Cal. Rptr. at 634. In Brisendine the California Supreme Court held that the defendant's
contraband had been seized in violation of the search and seizure clause of the California Con-
stitution. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d at 545, 531 P.2d at 1109, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 325. The court
held in cases of warrantless weapon searches the police must be able to point to specific and
articulable facts that reasonably justify a belief that the suspect was armed. Id. at 544-45,
531 P.2d at 1109, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 325. The holding in Brisendine was based upon the "in-
dependent vitality" of the California Constitution. Id. at 548, 531 P.2d at 1112, 119 Cal. Rptr.
at 328.
216. Lance, 37 Cal. 3d at 889, 694 P.2d at 754, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 641.
217. Lance, 37 Cal. 3d at 887, 694 P.2d at 752, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 639; see also supra
note 216 and accompanying text.
218. Lance, 37 Cal. 3d at 887, 694 P.2d at 752, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
219. Id.
220. Harris, 401 U.S. at 225-26.
221. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d at 113, 545 P.2d at 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
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The similarities of Disbrow to the rules abrogated in Lance, however,
are outweighed by the dissimilarities.
Disbrow, unlike the rules abrogated in Lance, is supported by
statutory authority. 2  The result in Lance is not compelled when a
rule, like Disbrow, fails within an exception to section 28(d). The
Lance Court held the intent behind section 28(d) would only be
defeated by a judicial exclusionary rule that was neither federally man-
dated nor supported by statute. 2 3
PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Although Disbrow falls within an expressed exception to section
28(d) and does not defeat the intent behind section 28(d), the rule
may be abrogated on another basis. Two arguments based upon general
principles of Constitutional interpretation may continue to threaten
Disbrow."4 These arguments, however, are not persuasive.
2 1
The first argument relates to the general rule requiring reconcilia-
tion of inconsistent constitutional provisions. 26 In this case, the two
inconsistent provisions are the privilege against self-incrimination in
article I, section 15 used to exclude evidence in Disbrow, and article
I, section 28(d) requiring that all relevant evidence be admitted to
trial. The fallacy in the argument requiring reconciliation of two in-
consistent constitutional provisions results from the exception within
section 28(d) for existing statutory rules of evidence relating to
privilege. 2 7 The California Evidence Code defines "statute" to in-
clude treaties and constitutional provisions. ' Therefore, notwith-
standing section 940, section 28(d) does not abrogate the privilege
against self-incrimination because section 15 is a constitutional provi-
sion relating to privilege.2 9 Therefore, section 28(d) and section 15
are not inconsistent, and need not be reconciled. 3 °
222. See supra notes 111-207 and accompanying text.
223. Lance, 37 Cal. 3d at 889, 694 P.2d at 754, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 641.
224. Barrios, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 746, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 652.
225. Id.
226. Section 28(d) was enacted subsequent to California's self-incrimination clause. Ally
doubt or ambiguity in attempts to reasonably reconcile two provisions should be resolved
in favor of the subsequent enactment. Wright v. Jordan, 192 Cal. 704, 713 (1923) (well-established
principle that certain provisions of a constitution or of a statute may be repealed or abrogated
by implication arising out of the adoption of changes or in other provisions thereof, rendering
obnoxious or ineffective the provisions thereof).
227. See CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, §28, subd. (d).
228. CAL. EVID. CODE §230. Section 230 states, "Statute includes a treaty and a constitu-
tional provision." Id.
229. CAL. CONS?. art. I, §15.
230. "Repealing a constitutional provision by implication is disfavored. They are recogniz-
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The second argument that Disbrow is overruled by section 28(d),
notwithstanding section 940, involves the premise that a more recent
constitutional enactment controls earlier constitutional enactments."'
In order for this argument to succeed, the two enactments must ad-
dress the same subject matter.232 Section 15 involves a constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination, 33 while section 28(d) does not.1
34
Instead, section 28(d) merely requires all relevant evidence to be ad-
mitted to trial, and does not attempt to relate to rules of privilege.
3 1
Because the two sections address different subject matter, the argu-
ment that section 28(d) controls section 15 fails. 36
Disbrow has survived the passage of section 28(d) by falling within
one of the exceptions to section 28(d).237 Disbrow does not fall within
the first exception to section 28(d)238 because the exclusion of prior
inconsistent statements obtained in violation of Miranda is not man-
dated by the United States Constitution. 23 9 Disbrow, however, does
fall within the, second exception to the general rule of admissibility
of section 28(d).240 Disbrow is encompassed within an existing statutory
rule of evidence relating to privilege.2" ' Evidence Code section 940
utilizes judicial interpretations to define the scope of the privilege
against self-incrimination.242 Disbrow, a judicial interpretation relating
to the privilege against self-incrimination, is encompassed within the
scope of section 940.243 The legislative history of section 940 and the
holding in Ramona support the proposition that Disbrow is within
the scope of Evidence Code section 940.244 Since Disbrow is encom-
passed within an exception to section 28(d), and because Lance in-
volved the fourth amendment, the ruling of Lance does not control
the result here.24 5 Furthermore, Lance only involved rules that were
ed only when two potentially conflicting laws cannot be harmonized [citation]. A repeal by
implication is particularly disfavored where the provision in question is a basic, long-standing
constitutional right such as the privilege against self-incrimination." Barrios, 166 Cal. App.
3d at 746, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 652.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. CAL. CONST. art. I, §15.
234. CAL. CONST. art. I, §28, subd. (d).
235. Id.
236. Barrios, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 746, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 652.
237. See supra notes 110-236 and accompanying text.
238. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 10; see also supra note 103 and accompanying text.
239. Harris, 410 U.S. at 225.
240. See supra notes 110-207 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 110-207 and accompanying text.
242. 7 CAL. L. REvisioN CotsM'N., supra note 112, at 170.
243. See supra notes 110-207 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 118-81 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 208-23 and accompanying text.
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not encompassed within any exception to section 28(d).246 Therefore,
Disbrow survived the enactment of section 28(d).
CONCLUSION
This comment has analyzed the impact of Proposition 8, section
28(d) upon the rule excluding evidence enunciated in Disbrow. A con-
flict appears to exist between section 28(d) requiring all relevant
evidence to be admitted to trial, and the rule in Disbrow excluding
relevant evidence. Had a conflict between section 28(d) and Disbrow
in fact existed, Disbrow would have been overruled by section 28(d).
This comment, however, has established that this conflict does not
exist. The conflict does not exist because Disbrow falls within the
express exception to the general rule of admissibility of section 28(d).
This comment has examined the exceptions to the general rule of
admissibility of section 28(d). Several California cases and the legislative
hisory of section 940 support the argument that Evidence Code sec-
tion 940 is an existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege
encompassing the rule in Disbrow. Supported by statutory authority
relating to privilege, the rule in Disbrow falls within the express
exception to section 28(d). The rule in Disbrow is not one of the
many independent exclusionary rules intended to be overruled by sec-
tion 28(d). The rule in Disbrow survives the enactment of section 28(d).
Katharine Martin
246. See supra notes 208-23 and accompanying text.
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